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 This chapter focuses on the means of environmental regulation—the techniques 
regulators use to reduce pollution.  It discusses traditional regulation (often called 
command-and-control regulation), the economic theory undergirding market-based 
environmental regulation, and increased use of market mechanisms.   This treatment of 
market mechanisms will consider them in institutional context, showing how a multilevel 
governance system implements market mechanisms. 
  Traditional Regulation 
 Prior to 1970, common law courts played a leading role in addressing 
environmental problems in many countries.  When polluti n invaded property rights, 
property owners would ask judges to award damages and order pollution abatement, 
claiming that the pollution constituted a trespass—an invasion of property, or a nuisance 
—an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property.1  Ironically, as 
environmental problems grew worse, common law adjudication of environmental 
disputes became less effective, because proving that a p rticular property owner had 
caused a significant harm became difficult when many different polluters contributed to 
an environmental problem.2 
 In the 1970s, developed country governments responded to growing 
environmental problems by enacting statutes creating environmental ministries and 
authorizing them to regulate significant pollution sources.  Sometimes these statutes 
contained specific requirements for specific industrie , but more often they authorized 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Castles Auto & Truck Service v. Exxon, 16 Fed. Appx. 163 (4th Cir. 2001); Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Alfred’s Case, 77 
Eng. Rep. 816 (1611).  
2 See Chris Schroeder, Lost in the Translation:  What Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot 
Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 583 (2002); see, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
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environmental ministries to regulate polluters under general criteria established in a 
statute.  Many of these statutes aimed to fully protect public health and the environment.  
But they often approached these lofty goals incrementally, relying heavily upon 
technology-based regulation.  Under this technology-based approach, environmental 
ministries set regulatory requirements for particular industries or firms that reflect 
pollution reduction technologies’ capabilities.  The resulting technology-based 
regulations secured significant reductions in environmental hazards in spite of population 
and consumption increases, even though they often did ot fully protect public health and 
the environment.  
 Most commentators refer to technology-based regulation s command and control 
regulation.  This term suggests that environmental ministries regularly dictate 
technological choices to regulated firms.  Technology-based regulation, however, offers 
some technological flexibility, when doing so is compatible with enforcement.    
Environmental regulators usually implement technology-based standards through 
performance standards, which require polluters to meet a particular pollution reduction 
target, rather than dictate use of a preferred technology.  This approach gives polluters the 
freedom to choose any technology they like, as longas they meet the quantitative 
pollution level required by the regulator.  For example, when the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a New Source Performance 
Standard for sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, it required that plant 
operators either meet a pounds of sulfur dioxide per million British Thermal Units target 
or a percentage reduction requirement for sulfur dioxi e emissions.3  While EPA 
anticipated that most utilities would employ “scrubbers” to meet this target, this 
                                                
3 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 198) 
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performance standard allowed them to choose any type of scrubber or any other 
technology that would meet this target.4   
 In cases where monitoring of pollution levels was not feasible, however, 
environmental ministries often impose “work practice” standards— i.e. standards that 
dictate a particular technological approach.5  For example, when EPA sought to regulate 
asbestos emissions stemming from building demolition, it recognized that measurement 
of these emissions would be impossible, so it requir d contractors to follow a specific set 
of procedures, such as wetting the asbestos, which would reduce emissions.  Thus, 
traditional regulation relies heavily on technology-based rules implemented through a 
mixture of performance and work practice standards.    
 Traditional regulation often relies upon u iform performance standards, i.e. 
standards that require the same amount of pollution reduction from each plant in a 
regulated industry.  Uniform standards allow regulators to address pollution from an 
entire category of pollution sources in a single proceeding and create a level playing field 
for competitors within an industry.   
 Commentators often invoke a dichotomy between command-and-control 
regulation and market mechanisms when discussing environmental regulation.6  While 
this dichotomy provides a convenient shorthand, both traditional regulation and so-called 
market mechanisms create markets.7  Traditional regulation requires polluters to reduce 
pollution.  As a result, regulated firms respond to these regulations by purchasing 
                                                
4 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?  Replacing the Command 
and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,  55 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 289, 300 (1998). 
5 See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
6 See Driesen, supra note 4.  
7 See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549, 565-66 (1996). 
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pollution control devices and services, thus creating an environmental services market.8  
Conversely, we shall see that market mechanisms, like traditional regulation, generally 
depend on effective government decision-making for their success.  
 In the 1980s, governance philosophies began to shift around the world, especially 
in English speaking countries.   President Reagan (US) and Prime Minister Thatcher 
(UK) glorified free markets and adopted policies reflecting skepticism of government 
regulation.  They enjoyed intellectual support from a burgeoning law and economics 
movement.  The law and economics movement tended to see free markets as a 
governance model and adopted economic efficiency, rathe  than full protection of public 
health and the environment, as a major goal.  In the United States, companies hoping to 
escape the burdens of strict government regulation funded think tanks to spread the free 
market gospel.  These think tanks supported pro-busines  government officials, like 
President Reagan, in their efforts to reform or eliminate regulation.     
 The rise of neoliberalism—the cultural exaltation of free markets—fueled 
criticism of traditional environmental regulation ad a call for reform.  Neoliberal critics 
referred to traditional regulation as “command and control” regulation, thus suggesting 
that it was overly prescriptive.  Critics derided uniform standards as a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, suggesting the need for greater flexibility.  And many of them advocated two 
primary reforms— increased use of market mechanisms as the means of environmental 
regulation, this chapter’s theme, and use of cost-benefit analysis as a check on 
environmental regulation’s stringency, the topic of Chapter 15.   
Economic Theory and Market Mechanisms 
                                                
8 See EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH:  FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT  
171 (1999). 
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 By convention, the term “market mechanisms” refers primarily to pollution taxes 
and environmental benefit trading.  This part will d scuss the economic theory underlying 
these two approaches.  It will then briefly address three other approaches sometimes 
discussed as market mechanisms — the offering of subsidies for low polluting 
technologies, the use of information to create incentiv s for environmental improvement 
and a more radical reform, and simple abandonment of regulation by environmental 
ministries in favor of voluntary regulation (which is covered more extensively elsewhere 
in this book).    
 Market-based approaches address an efficiency problem arising from the use of 
uniform standards.  Pollution control costs usually vary significantly from plant to plant 
even within the same industry.  This implies that an approach that shifted emission 
reductions from facilities with high pollution control costs to facilities with low pollution 
control costs could achieve any given industry-wide regulatory target at lower cost than a 
uniform standard would.  Market-based mechanisms encourage this sort of shift thereby 
increasing the cost effectiveness of pollution contr l.     
 Economists often recommend that governments levy a tax on each pound of 
pollution emitted in order to create an incentive for cost effective pollution abatement.  
Once a government establishes a tax rate, polluters will presumably implement pollution 
reduction projects when such projects have marginal costs less than that of paying the 
tax.  Conversely, polluters with pollution control options costing more than the tax rate 
presumably would choose to pay the tax and continue polluting.  Thus, a pollution tax 
efficiently shifts reductions from high to low cost facilities. 
 6 
 This approach limits the cost of environmental protection, but makes 
environmental results somewhat unpredictable. Results will depend on voluntary 
responses by polluters to the tax.  On the other hand, t xes place a cost on each unit of 
emissions, thereby creating a continuous incentive to r duce pollution.  Also, taxes raise 
revenue, which can be used to subsidize environmental improvements or for other 
societal goals.  Such taxes can be revenue neutral, if other taxes are reduced when a 
pollution tax is enacted.  Unfortunately though, pollution taxes create a conflict between 
the goal of providing reliable finance to government a d encouraging pollution 
abatement.  Pollution abatement implies foregone tax revenue; significant tax revenue 
implies foregone emission reductions.  On the other hand, some environmental taxation 
proponents claims that combining taxes on bads (pollution) with reduction of taxes on the 
good of wage income can yield a “double dividend,”  cleaning the environment and 
increasing employment simultaneously.    
 The literature usually credits the Canadian economist J. H. Dales with creating an 
alternative to the environmental taxation approach, environmental benefit trading.9  
Under an environmental benefit trading approach, the government establishes a 
performance standard for plants, just as in traditional regulation.  But the government 
authorizes facility owners to forego the required environmental improvement if they pay 
somebody else to make extra improvements in their st ad.  Under this approach polluters 
with high marginal control costs will avoid making pollution reductions at their own 
facility and presumably pay for reductions elsewhere.  Conversely, polluters with low 
marginal control costs will generate additional reductions to sell to those with high 
                                                
9 See J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); cf. DANIEL COLE, POLLUTION &  PROPERTY:  
COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION x (2002). 
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marginal control costs.  The shift of reductions to low cost facilities implies that private 
firms will achieve the government’s chosen regulatory arget at lower cost than would be 
possible under a uniform standards approach. 
 A well-designed environmental benefit trading provides more certainty about the 
quantity of reductions than a pollution tax.  But this quantitative mechanism provides less 
certainty about cost than a pricing mechanism like a pollution tax.    
 This approach usually provides only limited incentives to reduce emissions.  
There is no incentive to make reductions once the regulators’ limited goals have been 
achieved.  This can be cured, however, by auctioning off, rather than giving away, 
pollution allowances. In the past, polluters’ prefences for free allowances have 
prevented substantial auctioning of allowances.  But recently some regulators have 
moved toward auctioning allowances in programs addressing global climate change.   
 Governments sometimes encourage environmental improvements by subsidizing 
them.  Brazil, for example, has successfully employed subsidies as a key element of a 
successful strategy to develop a biofuels industry.  And many countries in Europe employ 
feed-in tariffs, guarantees of artificially high prices, to encourage renewable energy, 
sometimes with great success.10  
 Just as a tax can help internalize an externalized cost, a subsidy can help 
internalize clean technology’s environmental benefits, thereby having the same desirable 
economic effect.  But special interests tend to grow up around subsidies and demand their 
continuation long after the rationale for them has v nished.  Thus, governments around 
the world heavily subsidize fossil fuels, a mature and environmentally devastating 
                                                
10 See M IGUEL MENDONCA, FEED-IN TARIFFS:  ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
43 (2007) 
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industry that probably should be heavily taxed rather an subsidized.  Yet, governments 
have sometimes managed subsidies effectively.  For example, Brazil has actually reduced 
its subsidies to its biofuel industry as the industry has become economically viable.       
 Most commentators treat efforts to use information o motivate private decisions 
favoring the environment as market mechanisms.  TheUnited States in the late 1980s 
enacted a “Right-to-Know” law requiring chemical companies and other large 
manufacturers to report their releases of toxic chemicals into the environment.  The law 
required EPA to create a Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) to report the data to the public.  
Subsequently, many OECD countries enacted similar mandatory disclosure laws.  When 
firms implementing this law sought, often for the first time, to fully characterize their 
releases of toxic chemicals into the environment they discovered more releases than they 
anticipated.   Many firms responded to these revelations with voluntary efforts to reduce 
some of these releases. 11 We need more research into what motivated these decisions.  
The suggestion that the Right-to-Know Law constitutes a market mechanism implies that 
firms feared that high numbers in the TRI would trigger declining sales or stock prices.  
But it is at least possible that more general concerns about reputation in the community, 
fears of more stringent government regulation, or even genuine concern about their 
impact on the health of people working in or living ear their facilities might have 
motivated them.  These motivations might imply that reputational, regulatory, or moral 
incentives play a greater role than economic ones.    
 The European Union has spearheaded the use of eco-labels to inform consumers 
about the environmental attributes of products, in hopes of motivating consumers to make 
                                                
11 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation:  TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEORGETOWN L. J. 257 (2001). 
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environmentally friendly purchasing decisions.  A more modest and targeted program in 
the United States to label tuna caught in ways that do not endanger dolphins as “dolphin-
safe” survived an attack before the World Trade Organization.  Economists only 
hypothesize that free markets work optimally when market actors have perfect 
information, and recognize the pervasiveness of incomplete information.  Informational 
strategies can partially remedy this market defect.  In general, informing consumers and 
shareholders about the environmental attributes of products in hopes of motivating 
market actors to favor more environmentally friendly approaches constitutes another 
alternative or supplement to traditional regulation.               
 Economic theory does not support a more radical reform embraced by some free 
market champions and government officials, the simple abandonment of regulation.  
Economic theory in general recognizes that private tr nsactions do not take into the costs 
pollution imposes on society—the harms to human healt  and the environment— into 
account.  It characterizes these costs as “externalities,” costs not internalized in market 
transactions.  It therefore recognizes that some environmental regulation is justified.  Still 
voluntary programs can work well where protecting the environment is profitable.  So 
programs providing information to encourage greater energy efficiency among market 
actors have enjoyed significant successes.  Environmentalists have also embraced 
voluntary programs when political factors make government regulation completely 
ineffective, as for example in efforts to conserve tropical rainforests through sustainable 
logging practices, which governments have found difficult to mandate and enforce.  
While the wholesale abandonment of regulation has not been popular with the public and 
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enjoys no support in economic theory, some radical neo iberals and government officials 
embrace it.    
The Rise of Market Mechanisms  
 During the 1970s, government officials occasionally discussed market-based 
mechanisms and generally found them impractical.  During the 1980s, however, the 
debate shifted as neoliberalism began its ascent.  At the beginning of the decade market 
mechanisms enjoyed narrow, but somewhat powerful, support.  That support primarily 
came from regulated industries and pro-business government officials in the United 
States.  Many of these supporters regarded government regulation as too burdensome and 
saw market-based mechanisms as tools to reduce the burd n in spite of public support for 
environmental regulation.  Environmental lobbies saw these mechanisms primarily as 
methods of evading pollution control and tended to oppose them.   
 By the end of the 1980s, however, the debate had cnged dramatically, at least in 
the United States.  Environmental benefit trading by then had picked up the support of a 
wide variety of experts.  The more technocratic environmental lobbies and consultancies, 
most notably the Environmental Defense Fund in the United States, embraced market 
mechanisms.  Increasingly, the debate became focused not so much on the question of 
whether market-mechanisms were a plausible idea, but aro nd the issues of how to 
design them properly and when to use them.  Environmental taxation, however, enjoyed 
little support in the United States, the neoliberal ascent having increased hostility toward 
taxation generally.   
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   In continental Europe, by contrast, significant support existed for environmental 
taxation in some countries, in keeping with the recommendations of many experts.  
Support for environmental benefit trading, however, d veloped later.   
 Governments have used ecological taxes, primarily in Europe.  While some of 
these taxes are pure pollution taxes, which are levi d on a dollar per ton of pollutant 
bases, most are more indirect.  Examples of rather dir ct pollution taxes include Korea’s 
tax on sulfur emissions and Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Czech taxes on fuel’s 
sulfur content, which correlates with sulfur emissions.  Indirect taxes, such as high taxes 
on petrol in Europe can serve environmental goals, as petrol causes many environmental 
problems.  Singapore charges high taxes on automobiles, fees for vehicle entry into the 
city, and charges for rush hour driving to discourage congestion and the associated 
vehicular air pollution.  London has recently adopted a broadly similar congestion pricing 
scheme and New York City tried to follow suit, but the New York State legislature has so 
far declined to allow New York City to emulate Singapore and London’s environmental 
leadership.  Relatively few countries have implemented sufficiently high pollution taxes 
to motivate substantial emission reductions.  And many ecological taxes contain 
exemptions for high polluting industries, which greatly weakens their efficacy.  Still, 
some taxes, such as France’s water pollution tax, hve proven effective.     
 Competitiveness concerns accompanying globalization have impeded more robust 
development of pollution taxes.  The European Union, f r example, considered a carbon 
tax in the early 1990s as a means of addressing global warming.  But concerns about 
whether a carbon tax could adequately address competitiveness concerns without running 
afoul of World Trade Organization rules played a role in abandonment of community-
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wide taxation as the primary means of addressing climate change.  Still, several European 
countries, including Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, have subsequently adopted carbon 
taxes as part of their strategy to address global climate change.    
 Environmental benefit trading has become a much more widely used approach, 
primarily because of the United States’ influence.  The United States began 
experimenting with trading when it adopted project-based trading programs in the late 
1970s.  These programs treated facilities generating ir emissions as if they were encased 
in a bubble, focusing on plant-wide emissions, rather an achieving pollution reduction 
targets at each smokestack or other pollution source within a facility.  The bubble 
programs (as they were called) allowed polluters to increase pollution at some units 
within a facility, if they reduced pollution sufficiently at other units within the same 
facility.   
 The bubble programs produced large cost savings, but also a lot of evasion of 
emission reduction obligations.12  They failed (environmentally speaking) largely because 
they allowed pollution sources that were not subject to aps or strict monitoring of 
pollution levels to produce and sell emission reduction credits.   This approach gave rise 
to a host of problems.  Polluters often claimed credit for reductions that would have 
occurred anyway, rather than additional reductions.  These credits then would justify 
foregoing otherwise required new emission reductions.  Thus, a planned emission 
                                                
12 See Driesen, supra note n. ____, notes 120-127 and accompanying text (r viewing evidence and refuting 
defenses of bubbles’ integrity in the economics litera ure); CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PHASE III  RULE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF THE 
AEROSPACE COATING INDUSTRY 4 (1990) (finding that almost all large sources operating under a bubble are 
not achieving required reductions); RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION:  THE 
TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA’S BUBBLE 62-67, 89-91(1986) (providing examples); David Doniger, The Dark 
Side of the Bubble, 4 ENVTL. F., July, 1985, 33, 34-35 (same); RICHARD A. L IROFF, AIR POLLUTION 
OFFSETS:  TRADING, SELLING AND BANKING 22 (1980) (explaining that offsets can be a “meaningless paper 
game”). 
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reduction would basically be lost.  Similarly, facility owners would shut down 
uneconomic facilities and claim a credit for the emission reduction associated with 
ceasing operations.  This phantom credit would live on, justifying foregoing new 
emission reduction obligations, even after the facility died.  Shutdowns could easily lead 
to pollution increases at competing facilities, which could ramp up production to meet the 
demand the closed facility had previously met.  Because no cap applied to the industry as 
a whole, the programs could not account for these dmand shifts, which would in effect 
mean that, once again, bubbles lost planned emission reductions.   
 In 1990, however, the United States created a model program, the acid rain 
program.13  Because of its excellent design it garnered the support of many environmental 
lobbies, including the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which in the past had 
been a technically sophisticated opponent of trading.  This program capped the pollution 
levels of the major sources of sulfur dioxide, the principle pollutant responsible for acid 
rain, at levels representing a significant emission reduction.  It also imposed stringent 
monitoring requirements and generally only allowed well-monitored capped sources to 
generate credits.  This program produced significant pollution reduction at low cost and 
with exceptionally high compliance rates. 
 During the 1990s, international negotiations addressing global climate change 
became a forum for debate about market-based mechanisms.  This debate occurred, 
because the United States, along with several of its closest allies, wanted environmental 
benefit trading incorporated in the climate change regime.  The European Union greeted 
the idea of global environmental benefit trading with some skepticism, because of 
                                                
13 See Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L. J. 2707 (1991); 
Nancy Kete, The U.S. Acid Rain Allowance Trading System, in OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE:  DESIGNING A 
TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 78-108 (1992) 
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concerns about the efficacy of international environmental benefit trading.  Developing 
countries viewed trading as an effort by developed countries to simply evade their 
responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore as inequitable.14       
 In spite of this skepticism, the countries adopting he Kyoto Protocol to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protoc l) eventually agreed to a 
globalized environmental benefit trading approach.15  Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
countries and their nationals can purchase credits generated abroad to help them meet 
national emission reduction targets established in the agreement.   The European Union, 
perhaps surprisingly, has made this approach a centerpiece of its effort to comply with 
Kyoto targets even after the United States declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.     
 The European Union (EU) adopted a Directive creating the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS).  The ETS required national governments, subject to European 
Commission oversight, to limit the emissions of listed large industries.  The ETS calls for 
two phases, requiring member countries to develop National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
setting a cap for phase one and then making the caps stricter in phase two.   The first 
NAPs allocated too many allowances to regulated sources, and therefore led to a failure 
to realize emission reductions and a collapse in the price of pollution reduction credits 
generated to sell into the market.  As of this writing, the European Commission has 
disapproved most of the NAPs submitted for phase two, and the Commission and the 
member states are working on the issue of how much reduction the phase two NAPs 
should require.    
                                                
14 See generally JOYEETA GUPTA, TH E CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
FROM CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS (1997) 
15 See Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.9 (1997), reprinted without certain technical corrections in 37 I.L.M. 22 
(1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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 The EU also has adopted a “linking directive,” which allows European countries 
and their nationals to purchase credits realized through emission reduction projects 
undertaken outside the EU.  Thus, the ETS has becom a hybrid program, combining 
elements of the cap-and-trade approach successfully employed in the United States to 
address acid rain with crediting from project-based mechanisms that have a lot in 
common with the failed bubble programs. 
 The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) exemplifies the 
problematic nature of project-based trading.  This mechanism allows project developers 
to earn pollution reduction credits through pollution reducing projects in developing 
countries, even though these countries are not subject to caps on their emissions.  The 
Kyoto Protocol seeks to avoid the problems of the bubble programs by requiring that 
projects provide “additional” emission reductions.16  But the CDM’s Executive Board 
(the primary oversight body) has approved many projects where only a tiny fraction of 
project revenue comes from credit purchases.  Under such circumstances, it is very likely 
that these projects would have been undertaken without t e availability of pollution 
reduction credit.17  Once the credit is approved and sold, however, th purchaser will use 
the credit to justify not making an otherwise required reduction.  Thus, an emission 
reduction is lost and no additional emission reduction is realized to compensate for this 
loss.  Recent research suggests that these project-based trades have produced a significant 
loss of emission reductions.18  This subject, however, certainly requires additional 
                                                
16 See  Axel Michaelowa, Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM:  A Crucial Element 
of Credibility of the Climate Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS:  A HANDBOOK OF 
EMISSION REDUCTION METHODS (F. Yamin ed. 2005). 
17 See C Sutter & J.C. Parreño, Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism Deliver its Sustainable 
Development Claim?  An Analysis of Officially Registered CDM Projects, 84 CLIMATIC CHANGE 75 (2007). 
18 See Larry Lohman, Accounting, Organizations, and Society, at 12  (2008) (forthcoming); MICHAEL 
WARA &  DAVID G. V ICTOR, A REALISTIC POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL CARBON OFFSETS, (Program on 
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research.  In the past, follow-up studies have been too sporadic, but usually quite 
damning in the project-based context.   
 Another problem feared by a number of analysts involves so-called “hot air” 
credits undermining the achievements of the Kyoto Protocol.  Countries formerly part of 
the Soviet Union, including Russia, assumed caps sub tantially higher than their current 
emission under the Kyoto Protocol.  These higher caps reflected hard bargaining by 
Russia and the decline in emissions after 1990 that came about as an artifact of economic 
collapse in the former Soviet Union.  These countries could, in principle, sell credits 
reflecting the difference between their current emissions and their cap to countries with 
real emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Pr tocol.  These countries, in turn, 
could completely forego any real effort to reduce emissions, achieving virtual compliance 
through purchase of phantom credits.  So far, the possibility of credits becoming more 
valuable in the future and EU member states’ concerns about their environmental 
credibility has limited the use of hot air credits.  But this sort of problem may yet 
undermine the Kyoto Protocol’s achievements, as member states approach their 
compliance deadlines and face hard choices between making real changes and buying 
their way out of their obligations.  The main point is hat a well designed trading program 
can succeed, but most trading programs afford multiple opportunities to evade 
compliance obligations in complicated ways that can sometimes escape public 
recognition.   
 Since the adoption of the EU ETS, the debate on market mechanisms has shifted 
markedly, especially within continental Europe.  The debate focuses heavily on questions 
                                                                                                                                      
Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #74, 2008), available at 
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/a_realistic_policy_on_international_carbon_offsets/; Michael Wara, Is 
the Global Carbon Market Working? 445 NATURE 595 (2007). 
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of design and institutional architecture, and less on the question of whether trading is 
workable in an international context.       
 In the wake of the acid rain program’s success, many countries adopted 
environmental trading approaches even apart from the climate change context and it 
became a dominant regulatory strategy within the United States.  The use of tradable 
fishing quotas as a fishery management tool, for example, became common around the 
world.19  Under this approach, regulators limit the allowable catch, just as they might 
without a trading program, in order to conserve a fishery.  But they allow those who catch 
fewer fish than their quota permits to sell the unused portion of the quota to other 
fishermen, who can use the purchased allowances to ju tify exceeding their quota.   These 
programs have generated controversy; as they are difficult to monitor and do not 
effectively address the problem of bycatch (catching too much fish not subject to the 
quota regime) or ecosystem effects.20 
 Regulatory scholars think of market-based mechanisms as examples of 
privatization, since both environmental taxation and e vironmental benefit trading 
provide greater scope for private choice than traditional regulation.  Taxes allow private 
parties to decide whether to reduce environmental impacts at all; trading allows private 
parties to choose the location of reductions and the technology used.  Both taxes and 
                                                
19 See Suzi Kerr, Evaluation of the Cost Effectiveness of the New Zealand Individual Transferable Quota 
Fisheries Market, in TRADABLE PERMITS:  POLICY EVALUATION , DESIGN, AND REFORM (OECD 2004); 
M.D. Young, The Design of Fishing-Right Systems-The NSW Experienc , 31 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 305 
(1999); W. Davidson, Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience with Property Rights in the Dutch Fishery, 
in THE DEFINITION AND ALLOCATION OF USE RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FISHERIES:  PROCEEDINGS OF A SECOND 
WORKSHOP HELD IN BREST, FRANCE, 5-7 MAY 1999 (A. Hatcher & K. Robinson eds. 1999); L.G. 
Anderson, Privatizing Open Access Fisheries:  Individual Transferable Quotas, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (D.W. Bromley ed. 1995); J.J.C. Ginter, The Alaska Community 
Development Quota Fisheries Management Program, 28 OCEAN &  COASTAL MGM’T 147 (1995)  
20 See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 71-75 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds. 2007). 
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trading, however, depend heavily upon the efficacy of government decision-making, 
since governments must choose a sufficient tax rate or r gulatory cap in order for market 
mechanisms to be effective.   
 Both forms of regulation also require effective government enforcement.  A tax 
on each pound of emissions requires measurement of missions.  If the government lacks 
the capacity to adequately monitor taxed emissions, then polluters can evade their tax 
obligation by understating their emissions.  Trading further complicates enforcement by 
requiring measurement of emission reductions in two places in order to verify that one 
party has complied with the terms of a trading program.  When a polluter exceeds its 
allowance and relies on purchased allowances to make up the difference, it has only 
complied if the allowances purchased reflect the amount of pollution reduction claimed 
and the actual emissions at its facility exceed the limit by the proper amount and not 
more.  This means regulators must verify both claimed debits and credits to know 
whether a facility has complied with a pollution reduction obligation through trading.  
Broad trading programs can multiply the number and types of credits requiring 
verification and therefore strain regulatory capacity, but narrower programs can be well 
monitored.          
 Thus, the acid rain program succeeded largely becaus  the United States Congress 
imposed a cap demanding a large reduction in emission  and required state-of-the-art 
continuous emissions monitoring.  By contrast, programs with less demanding emission 
limits underlying them or that allow credits from sources not subject to caps and strict 
monitoring requirements often fail.  Trading offers private actors choice in the selection 
of reduction techniques and locations, which makes th m attractive to regulated firms and 
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neoliberal governments.  But they depend for their eff cacy on effective government 
monitoring and enforcement.21 
 Unfortunately no purchaser of an emission reduction credit has any intrinsic 
reason to care about the quality of the service he is purchasing.  If the credit is good 
enough for the regulator, it satisfies the buyer.  Environmental benefit markets differ 
from more conventional markets in this respect.  If you buy a pair of blue jeans, you do 
care about its quality, whether the government does or not.  If they are not well made 
they will wear out.  This intrinsic concern for quality acts as a force encouraging the 
producers of ordinary consumer goods to make goods f reasonably good quality.  Poor 
quality emission credits, however, offer the cheapest and best compliance option, unless 
government regulators recognize their poor quality nd disallow their use.22 
 Early trading proponents claimed that trading not only increases regulation’s cost 
effectiveness, but also sparks more innovation thanraditional regulation ever did.23  This 
claim, in its simplest form at least, has fallen into disrepute.24  Trading reduces incentives 
to innovate among polluters with high control costs (they can escape by purchasing 
credits), while increasing incentives for innovation at those with low costs (they can go 
                                                
21 See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12 (2008)  
22 See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?:  The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change 
Convention, 26 BOST. COLL. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1998). 
23 See, e.g.,  Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:  The Democratic 
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 171, 183 (1988); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, 
Emissions Trading:  Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L. 217, 234-235 (1988); 
Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:  A New Era fo  an Old 
Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 13 (1991); Adam B. Jeff et al., Environmental Policy & Technological Change, 
22 ENVT’L &  RES. ECON. 41, 51 (2002). 
24 See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION:  LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds. 
2007); Joel E. Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation, 48 J. ENVT’L ECON. 
&  MNGMT. 1192 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation, 44 J. 
ENVT’L ECON. &  MNGMT. 23 (2002); Juan-Pablo Montero, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. 293 (2002). 
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“beyond compliance” in order to sell credits to theescapees).25  Therefore, the innovation 
picture is complex.26  
 Trading eliminates any incentive to employ innovations costing more than the 
relatively low cost generated by the permit market.27  This can eliminate incentives for 
the most technologically advanced innovations, which often prove expensive.28  On the 
other hand, the increased flexibility trading provides can provide incentives to employ 
some types of low cost innovation that would be lacking in a less flexible system. 
 Careful empirical work on the acid rain trading program in the United States 
shows less innovation in the acid rain program than in the traditional regulatory program 
that preceded it.29  The scholars reaching this conclusion have disagreed about whether 
trading may nevertheless have changed the type of inn vation.   A tension exists between 
maximizing short term cost effectiveness and maximizing long-term technological 
advancements that depend on initially expensive innovation.  Emissions trading 
maximizes short term cost effectiveness, not necessarily long-term technological 
advancement.30  We clearly need more and better research that seeks to compare 
emissions trading’s track record in stimulating innovation with that of alternative 
approaches.  Such research must take care to distinguish innovation, the introduction of 
new technology, from diffusion, the spread of old technology and carefully compare 
                                                
25 See Chuhlo Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industrial Level,:  
An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. &  MGMT. 95, 95 (1996); David A Malueg, 
Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVT’L 
ECON. &  MGMT. 52 (1987);  
26 See Robert P. Annex, Stimulating Innovation in Green Technology:  Policy Alternatives and 
Opportunities, 44 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 188, 201 (2002) 
27 See David M. Driesen, Does Innovation Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 
10094, 10097 (2003). 
28 See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding:  Emissions 
Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 INDIANA L. J. 21, 49-51 (2008) 
29 See Margaret Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of Invention:  The Case of SO2 Control, 27 L. &  
POL’Y 348 (2005);  
30 See Driesen, supra note 27, at 57. 
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trading and comparable non-trading approaches while accounting for other variables, 
such as stringency, that can influence innovation rates.31         
 Innovation can be important in advancing our capabilities to meet significant 
environmental challenges over time.32  On the other hand, incremental change, which 
well designed trading programs encourage in a cost effective way, can sometimes prove 
useful. 
   We have some experience with special kinds of incentive mechanisms that may 
perform better than trading or taxes alone in spurring innovation.33  One can use negative 
economic incentives to spur positive economic incentiv s.34  An example comes from 
France’s use of effluent fees to fund waste water tr atment, with very good results.  
Systems that require a deposit on beverage containers and then pay for returned empty 
containers have spurred a lot of clean-up of litter, not an especially innovative response 
technologically, but one that suggests the power of combining positive and negative price 
incentives.35  California has proposed a system where purchasers of high emission 
vehicles would pay a fee that would subsidize purchase of low emission vehicles.36  Such 
feebate systems may powerfully influence innovation as they simultaneously punish 
polluters and reward cleanup.  Germany has enacted a law requiring manufacturers to 
                                                
31 See Driesen, supra note 23, at 454-56. 
32 See generally Richard Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law:  A Conceptual 
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981); DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2003). 
33 See M IKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES:  MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY 
(1994). 
34 See Robert W Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems:  How the Patient Followed 
the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 104-107 (1994)  
35 See PETER BOHM, DEPOSIT-REFUND SYSTEMS:  THEORY AND APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSERVATION AND CONSUMER POLICY (Resources for the Future, 1981). 
36 See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, DRAFT SCOPING PLAN :  A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE (JUNE 
2008 DISCUSSION DRAFT) 20-21, available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/draftscopingplan.htm; Nathaniel Greene & Vanessa 
Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right:  Incentives for Cleaner, More Efficient Vehicles 12 PACE ENVT’L L. 
REV. 91, 94-97 (1994). 
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take back and properly dispose of packaging accompanying products.  This approach 
creates a powerful incentive to minimize packaging by forcing an internalization of 
disposal costs, which usually have been externalized.   
 Environmental benefit trading also raises environme tal justice issues in many 
contexts.  Even in the United States, which has becom  almost religious in its devotion to 
trading approaches, the government has often recognized that trading of carcinogenic 
pollutants raises serious ethical issues.  Under a trading approach, a polluter can leave its 
neighbors exposed to very high cancer risk if it pays somebody else far away to reduce 
emissions.  This problem materialized in California when regulators allowed petroleum 
refiners in low income communities of color to escape pollution control obligations in 
exchange for payments for reductions in vehicle polluti n.  This left communities near 
the plant exposed to cancer risks that would have be n significantly reduced in the 
absence of trading.  This led to a lawsuit and a political uproar that derailed one of 
California’s emissions trading programs.   
 Indifference to the location of reductions might be perfectly justifiable with 
respect to a globally mixed pollutant like carbon dioxide, but can seem unethical when 
pollutants’ effects on particular communities depend o  their location.  But trading under 
the Kyoto Protocol has given rise to some less obvious equitable concerns.  For example, 
a project capturing methane emissions from a landfill slated for closure in South Africa 
gave rise to fears that this remnant of apartheid would remain open because of revenue 
from the trading markets.  Just as relentless pursuit of short term cost effectiveness does 
not necessarily coincide with long-term technological development, so may short term 
efficiency, in some cases, conflict with fairness.   
 23 
Multilevel Trading 
 Instrument choice and implementation of the chosen instrument take place in the 
context of a proliferation of multilevel governance.  At the same time, once governments 
select market mechanisms, the selection and the ideology underlying the selection, can 
influence governance structures.   
 The Kyoto Protocol offers perhaps the best vehicle for exploring the layering of 
governance levels.  For choices about whether to use trading and how to implement it 
when it is used in this context involve numerous leve s of government as well as novel 
private sector roles.   This multiplicity, however, is not unique to the Kyoto Protocol.  
Rather, the Kyoto Protocol offers an especially intricate example of multileveled 
governance.   
 In the past, many international agreements have limited the pollution coming from 
the countries involved without specifying the mechanisms for limiting pollution.37  It 
would be possible to craft a climate change agreement that established reduction targets 
for national governments, but said nothing about how they should achieve these targets.  
Such an approach would leave countries quite free to choose between traditional 
regulation, emissions trading, pollution taxes, andeven voluntary approaches, as long as 
the countries met their internationally agreed upon g als.  
 The parties to the Kyoto Protocol, however, decided to address the instrument 
choice issue in the international agreement itself, rather than only on the national level.   
As a result, the Kyoto Protocol contains no less than three emissions trading programs, 
allowing developed countries, and often their regulated firms, to purchase credits from 
                                                
37 See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L. 
Q. 1, 18-19 (2000). 
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developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism, from Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union through the Joint Implementation Program, and from other 
developed countries with reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.  The big 
advantage of this global approach, however fragmented, is that it allows for international 
trading of emission reduction credits.  The large market thus created will tend to produce 
greater cost savings than a smaller market would have.38  At the same time, the use of 
international trading greatly increases the complexity of institutional challenges facing 
governments implementing the trading programs, which creates risks of lost emission 
reductions.   
 The Kyoto Protocol itself, however, does not operationalize any trading program.  
It simply creates a framework for these programs that would only come to life if 
implemented by nation states.  This feature of the Kyoto Protocol is common to 
substantially all international environmental agreem nts; they all depend on national 
implementation, because there is no international bureaucracy capable of regulating 
private conduct directly.39  Since most environmental harms stem from private production 
and consumption decisions, countries, or some other sub-global governmental unit, must 
enact regulatory programs in order to implement international agreements aimed at 
reducing environmental hazards.     
 The European Union assumed a leadership role in coordinating Europe’s 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, while still leaving many substantial decisions to 
member states.  Thus, the European Union as a whole, n t each member state, chose to 
implement an emissions trading program.  This choice in turn, reflected the global 
                                                
38 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:  Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 
YALE L. J. 677, 717 (1999)  
39 See Driesen, supra note 36, at 15. 
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decision embodied in the Kyoto Protocol to favor trading.  While the Kyoto Protocol did 
not require countries to use trading, its support f trading no doubt influenced the EU 
decision to adopt it.     
 While the EU as a whole made some important trading esign decisions, it left the 
most important decision of all, the amount of reductions to require from facilities in the 
trading scheme, largely to member states.40  Yet, the ETS does provide for European 
Commission review of the NAPs, and provides criteria under which the European 
Commission may disapprove of insufficiently ambitious NAPs, which the Commission 
has exercised.  The decision to leave critical decisions about the stringency of caps 
primarily to member states left those states vulnerabl  to lobbying based on 
competitiveness concerns.  This vulnerability contributed to weakness in the NAPs, 
especially with respect to highly competitive energy intensive industries, like aluminum 
smelting.  The European Commission has recognized this problem and is considering 
having the EU set the cap for a third phase of trading envisioned after 2012.     
 Because the EU trading scheme links up with the “project-based mechanisms” 
(the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementatio  programs that garner 
credits from individual projects), the integrity ofthe scheme depends upon effective 
oversight of claims of emission reduction credits earn d around the world.  The Kyoto 
Protocol has spawned a complex multi-level governance structure seeking to assure these 
credits’ integrity. 
                                                
40 See Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the European Union’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 437-474, 443-444 
(2007).  
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 At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol has created subsidiary bodies to 
exercise oversight and provide expert advice.  The most prominent of these bodies is the 
CDM Executive Board, which approves methodologies for estimating emission 
reductions from various types of projects.  It also must approve projects before project 
developers can sell credits in the international markets.  Since this body cannot itself 
verify emission reductions on the ground in the developing countries where developers 
carry out CDM projects, Kyoto’s architecture relies on national governments and private 
entity enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol as well.  The Kyoto Protocol delegates 
decisions about whether projects contribute to “sustainable development” to host country 
governments, which may disapprove of projects, but these governments, with the notable 
exception of China, have rarely exercised serious oversight.   Since developing countries 
often lack the capacity to monitor and verify emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol 
privatizes that function, allowing “designated operational entities” to verify emission 
reductions.  The CDM Executive Board must approve these entities.  In practice though, 
these entities are usually consultant firms hired by the project developer.  This means that 
conflicts of interest threaten the system’s integrity.41   Whether ultimately successful or 
not, international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex 
architecture, with responsibilities shared among globa  international bodies (CDM 
Executive Board), regional international bodies (EU Commission), national governments, 
and private entities.   
 Because the United States’ federal government has not implemented the Kyoto 
Protocol, subnational governmental bodies in that country initially took the lead in 
                                                
41 See Wara & Victor, supra note 18, at 19. 
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addressing climate change, including the initiation of emissions trading programs.42  The 
first program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), consists of an agreement 
of governors of the northeastern states to require emission reductions from their electric 
utilities and allow trading to reduce the cost of these reductions.43  This agreement not 
only offers an example of regional governance, it embodies multilevel governance within 
the region.  The agreement creates a “Regional Organization” to perform central 
coordinating tasks, such as auctioning allowances.44  Furthermore, the regional agreement 
resolves very important issues, such as the amount of reductions required, on the regional 
level.45  But it leaves many important decisions, (e.g. how many of the allowances to 
auction, how to use revenue realized from the auction) to states within the region.  
California and other states also are currently moving toward implementing emissions 
trading schemes.46   
 Of course, all of this leads to coordination difficulties.  The European 
Commission has been in contact with California and RGGI staff to discuss coordination 
issues.  When the United States federal government enacts an emissions trading scheme, 
it will face an issue of how to coordinate its effort with the state programs already 
                                                
42 See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 21, at 8-10; Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the 
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underway.  The European Union has already faced a similar issue arising from an early 
emissions trading program in the United Kingdom, which predated the EU ETS.   
 Those seeking to coordinate these programs will face the familiar issues 
regulators confront in an age of globalization and multilevel governance, albeit in a 
slightly different context.  Many of those running these programs have accepted free 
trade principles at the heart of neoliberalism, andthink that a well coordinated global 
market would be better than a series of national and sub-national markets.  Such 
coordination can maximize the cost savings trading programs can deliver.47  At the same 
time, such coordination may spark a race-to-the-bottom, as countries that restrict credit 
sales into their markets to make sure that they meet strict standards of environmental 
integrity may come under pressure to avoid interfernce with the global market in 
credits.48  Already, most jurisdictions generating credits for sale in international markets 
exercise very little oversight, because of competitiv ness concerns.  If project developers 
cannot develop their preferred projects in one country, they can just go elsewhere.   
 Government bodies will face conflicting pressures.  Lovers of free markets will 
clamor to reduce transaction costs that might impede trades.49  But supporters of 
environmental integrity will insist on raising transaction costs to pay for the oversight 
needed to make sure that only environmentally sound projects generate credits.50  Hence, 
international environmental benefit trading markets create problems similar to those 
associated with globalization more generally.   
                                                
47 See Kysar &Meyler, supra note 21, at 14.. 
48 See generally id. at 15-16 (describing how states must cope with the question of whether linkage with 
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49 See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Function of Transaction Costs:  Rethinking Transaction 
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZONA L. REV. 61, 79-82 (2005). 
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 Multilevel environmental governance and many of its complexities arise whether 
or not regulators employ market mechanisms.  But when t ey choose market mechanisms 
that traverse national borders, they greatly complicate the governance challenges they 
face.  And the neoliberalism that supports environme tal benefit trading generally also 
supports the broadest possible trading markets.  Environmental benefit trading offers 
terrific potential for cost reduction, but poses significant challenges for regulators, which 
grow exponentially when the mechanism is globalized.    
Conclusion 
 Market-based instruments have become increasingly mportant as neoliberalism 
has advanced.  While these instruments provide a cost effective way of realizing 
environmental improvements, they depend on government d sign and enforcement for 
their efficacy.  Increasingly, designers of emission  trading programs in particular find 
themselves operating in a complex context of multileve  governance.   
     
   
   
       
 
